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Abstract:	  
	  
This	  article	  discusses	  how	  a	  small	  place	  –	  the	  polling	  booth	  –	  can	  be	  bounded	  as	  an	  
ethnographic	  site	  with	  reference	  to	  the	  political	  and	  democratic	  event	  that	  it	  is	  
supposed	  to	  facilitate.	  Concerns	  about	  the	  socio-­‐material	  bounding	  of	  the	  booth	  
form	  the	  main	  empirical	  case	  –	  a	  debate,	  which	  recently	  occurred	  in	  Denmark	  
when	  the	  government	  proposed	  to	  digitalise	  voting.	  Digitalisation	  here	  became	  a	  
controversy	  because	  of	  the	  potential	  illicit	  influences	  that	  computer	  experts	  argued	  
would	  enter	  the	  polling	  booth	  and	  challenge	  the	  secrecy	  and	  the	  privacy	  of	  the	  vote,	  
the	  transparency	  of	  the	  electoral	  process,	  and	  thus	  the	  electoral	  enactment	  of	  
democracy	  itself.	  In	  this	  way	  the	  polling	  booth	  potentially	  works	  as	  an	  
ethnographic	  entry	  point	  for	  following	  shifts	  in	  contemporary	  debates.	  	  Keywords:	  ethnography,	  digitalisation,	  elections,	  place,	  event,	  democracy	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  Places	  
	  
Introduction	  In	  January	  2012,	  12	  Danish	  municipalities	  submitted	  an	  application	  to	  the	  Ministry	  for	  Economic	  Affairs	  and	  the	  Interior	  requesting	  permission	  to	  conduct	  binding	  experiments	  with	  electronic	  voting	  technologies	  (e-­‐voting)	  during	  the	  upcoming	  municipal	  election	  in	  November	  2013.	  Voters	  at	  select	  polling	  places	  would	  be	  allowed	  to	  use	  computers	  instead	  of	  pencils	  and	  paper	  to	  cast	  their	  ballots.	  The	  government	  strongly	  supported	  the	  idea	  and	  set	  in	  motion	  the	  preparations	  of	  a	  law	  proposal	  to	  allow	  for	  the	  conduct	  of	  the	  experiments.	  However,	  to	  the	  surprise	  of	  many	  of	  the	  people	  involved,	  the	  law	  proposal,	  named	  L132,	  was	  withdrawn	  in	  March	  2013	  after	  failing	  to	  get	  the	  necessary	  support	  to	  make	  it	  to	  the	  second	  reading	  in	  parliament.	  In	  the	  preceding	  months,	  L132	  had	  become	  controversial	  because	  the	  digitalisation	  of	  voting	  was	  seen	  by	  a	  small	  but	  very	  vocal	  community	  of	  computer	  experts	  as	  turning	  the	  polling	  booth	  from	  a	  place	  ensuring	  the	  isolation	  of	  the	  voters	  and	  the	  privacy	  of	  their	  vote,	  into	  a	  networked	  space	  open	  to	  undetectable	  manipulation.	  Where	  proponents	  argued	  that	  e-­‐voting	  would	  modernise	  the	  electoral	  process	  by	  allowing	  easier	  casting	  of	  ballots	  and	  effective	  tallying	  of	  votes,	  its	  opponents	  argued	  that	  the	  potential	  digital	  connectedness	  would	  jeopardise	  fundamental	  democratic	  principles	  including	  not	  only	  the	  secrecy	  of	  the	  vote	  but	  also	  transparency	  and	  public	  control	  of	  the	  electoral	  process.	  	  This	  article	  takes	  the	  public	  controversy	  over	  L132	  as	  a	  cue	  for	  a	  discussion	  of	  the	  parallel	  bounding	  of	  democratic	  sites	  and	  ethnographic	  field-­‐sites.	  The	  concern	  expressed	  by	  computer	  experts	  over	  the	  bounding	  of	  the	  polling	  booth	  reflects	  our	  concern	  as	  ethnographers	  about	  how	  to	  study	  elections	  and	  polling	  places	  as	  socio-­‐material	  and	  cultural	  phenomena	  that	  cannot	  easily	  be	  bounded	  in	  time	  and	  space.	  Anthropology	  has	  traditionally	  focused	  on	  what	  occurred	  in	  small	  places	  or	  locations,	  yet	  regarded	  the	  practices	  of	  these	  places	  as	  crystallising	  or	  being	  related	  to	  ‘large’	  and	  general	  issues	  of	  human	  society	  and	  culture	  (cf.	  Eriksen	  1993).	  Recent	  approaches	  such	  as	  multi-­‐sited	  ethnography	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still	  take	  the	  local	  and	  locations	  as	  a	  starting	  point	  for	  extending	  explorations	  of	  interconnectedness	  and	  complexity	  (see	  Marcus	  1995;	  Gupta	  &	  Ferguson	  1997),	  which	  in	  turn	  has	  generated	  calls	  for	  self-­‐imposed	  limitations	  to	  reconsider	  the	  bounded	  field-­‐site	  as	  generative	  of	  ethnographic	  meaning	  and	  focus	  (Candea	  2007).	  We	  take	  up	  the	  thread	  of	  addressing	  democracy	  as	  a	  large	  issue	  from	  the	  vantage	  point	  of	  the	  polling	  booth	  as	  a	  small	  bounded	  place.	  This	  focus	  results	  from	  an	  ethnographic	  interest	  in	  our	  informants’	  concerns;	  these	  informants,	  public	  servants,	  politicians	  and	  computer	  experts,	  engaged	  exactly	  the	  question	  of	  boundedness	  during	  the	  controversy	  over	  the	  digital	  booth.	  	  	  Where	  anthropologists	  have	  previously	  tended	  to	  see	  voting	  as	  political	  ritual,	  some	  of	  the	  more	  recent	  theorisations	  have	  been	  inspired	  by	  science	  and	  technology	  studies	  in	  focusing	  on	  the	  socially	  performative	  quality	  of	  the	  technologies	  and	  techniques	  of	  voting,	  and	  how	  it	  extends	  beyond	  the	  confines	  of	  Election	  Day	  and	  its	  polling	  places	  (Bertrand,	  Briquet	  &	  Pels	  2007;	  Coles	  2007;	  Kelty	  2008;	  Vadgaard	  2016).	  We	  align	  ourselves	  with	  this	  shift	  in	  approach	  in	  addressing	  democracy	  and	  elections	  as	  socio-­‐materially	  enacted,	  because	  the	  controversy	  over	  the	  digitalisation	  of	  the	  Danish	  polling	  booth	  emerged	  from	  its	  potential	  social	  and	  material	  connectedness	  to	  ambiguous	  outside	  influences	  across	  time	  and	  space,	  and	  the	  vulnerabilities	  brought	  about	  by	  those	  connections.	  The	  recent	  fears	  about	  the	  potential	  compromising	  of	  the	  2016	  American	  presidential	  election	  by	  Russian	  hackers	  fully	  demonstrates	  the	  timeliness	  of	  this	  discussion,	  even	  if	  polling	  technologies	  in	  the	  USA	  have	  long	  been	  a	  controversy	  (Saltman	  2006:	  200-­‐211).	  By	  asking	  what	  kind	  of	  place	  is	  made	  or	  unmade	  by	  the	  digitalisation,	  we	  want	  to	  reach	  out	  from	  the	  polling	  booth	  to	  also	  gain	  an	  understanding	  of	  the	  events	  and	  processes	  that	  produce	  it,	  to	  make	  our	  ethnographic	  bounding	  come	  from	  our	  informants’	  (un-­‐)bounding	  of	  the	  site	  (cf.	  Candea	  2007).	  As	  argued	  by	  Coles	  among	  others	  (2007:	  127),	  the	  relevant	  events	  cannot	  be	  confined	  to	  place	  and	  the	  moment	  of	  the	  ‘the	  election	  ritual’	  only,	  but	  also	  include	  contemporary	  debates	  and	  cultural	  transformations.	  Our	  approach	  thus	  also	  expresses	  a	  processual	  understanding	  of	  voting	  (Gad	  &	  Dalsgaard	  2015,	  2017),	  which	  takes	  into	  account	  both	  its	  practical	  and	  socio-­‐material	  circumstances	  and	  its	  generative	  potential	  when	  it	  comes	  to	  conceptual	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and	  symbolic	  meanings	  related	  to	  democracy	  and	  boundaries.	  Actions	  and	  processes	  are	  mediated	  by	  the	  materialities	  of	  the	  voting	  system	  at	  hand,	  and	  these	  materialities	  are	  always	  social	  as	  the	  specific	  designs	  embody	  values	  by	  affording	  or	  constricting	  actions,	  yet	  without	  determining	  them.	  	  The	  structure	  of	  the	  article	  is	  as	  follows.	  First	  we	  will	  clarify	  how	  the	  polling	  booth	  produces	  and	  protects	  the	  secret	  ballot	  as	  a	  central	  feature	  of	  democratic	  elections.	  Then	  we	  move	  on	  to	  discuss	  the	  kinds	  of	  actions	  that	  characterise	  the	  small	  place	  in	  relation	  to	  elections	  as	  events,	  and	  we	  explore	  the	  controversy	  of	  bounding	  the	  polling	  booth	  that	  emerged	  during	  the	  public	  debate	  about	  e-­‐voting	  in	  Denmark,	  and	  how	  this	  debate	  was	  inspired	  by	  insights	  and	  arguments	  from	  computer	  science.	  Finally	  we	  return	  to	  a	  discussion	  of	  what	  constitutes	  the	  polling	  booth	  as	  a	  small	  place,	  and	  how	  it	  is	  interesting	  as	  an	  ethnographic	  site.	  
	  
The	  polling	  booth	  as	  place	  	  What	  polling	  booths	  across	  cultures	  have	  in	  common	  is	  that	  they	  attempt	  to	  create	  a	  state-­‐controlled	  and	  orderly	  space,	  which	  individualises	  persons	  as	  autonomous	  voters	  by	  detaching	  them	  from	  their	  local	  and	  meaningful	  social	  relationships	  and	  the	  concomitant	  social	  obligations.	  As	  an	  individualising	  device,	  the	  booth	  constructs	  the	  voter	  as	  an	  ‘ideal-­‐type’	  by	  cutting	  his	  or	  her	  social	  relations	  in	  a	  specific	  place	  for	  a	  brief	  duration	  (see	  Bertrand,	  Briquet	  &	  Pels	  2007).	  The	  voter	  performs	  the	  cut	  when	  entering	  the	  booth	  alone	  and	  by	  closing	  the	  curtains	  (if	  there	  are	  any)	  to	  make	  sure	  that	  there	  are	  no	  witnesses	  to	  the	  act	  of	  voting.	  After	  being	  separated	  from	  other	  people,	  the	  voter	  may	  mark	  his	  or	  her	  choice	  on	  a	  ballot	  in	  private.	  The	  voter	  is	  then	  subsequently	  separated	  from	  the	  ballot,	  when	  it	  is	  dropped	  into	  a	  ballot	  box.	  Here	  it	  becomes	  indistinguishable	  from	  other	  ballots	  apart	  from	  the	  one	  characteristic,	  which	  now	  counts	  namely	  who	  or	  what	  has	  been	  voted	  for.	  The	  secret	  ballot	  is	  thus	  the	  result	  of	  a	  series	  of	  cuts	  in	  a	  process	  that	  counteracts	  unwarranted	  witnessing	  but	  also	  prevents	  voters	  from	  being	  able	  to	  provide	  proof	  of	  how	  they	  voted.	  	  Bertrand,	  Briquet	  and	  Pels	  refer	  to	  the	  secret	  ballot	  ensured	  by	  the	  polling	  booth	  as	  one	  of	  the	  most	  treasured	  and	  possibly	  most	  fetishised	  technologies	  of	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western	  liberal	  democracy	  (ibid.).	  If	  electoral	  officials	  do	  not	  ensure	  the	  privacy	  of	  the	  voter	  (i.e.	  the	  separation	  of	  the	  voters	  from	  witnesses	  and	  from	  their	  ballots),	  the	  international	  community	  and	  electoral	  observers	  will	  quickly	  regard	  the	  election	  in	  question	  as	  compromised.	  This	  was	  not	  always	  so.	  The	  secret	  ballot	  has	  a	  particular	  historical	  origin,	  and	  many	  critics	  were	  opposed	  to	  it	  during	  the	  process	  of	  its	  introduction	  in	  the	  19th	  century	  and	  onwards.1	  Prior	  to	  this,	  ‘open	  polling	  configured	  elections	  as	  a	  special	  type	  of	  ritual	  […]	  polling	  was,	  literally,	  a	  public	  action.’	  (Orr	  2015:	  95).	  In	  the	  UK,	  for	  example,	  elections	  held	  before	  the	  introduction	  of	  the	  secret	  ballot	  have	  been	  described	  as	  ‘spectacles’	  (O’Gorman	  2007).	  It	  was	  noted	  in	  poll	  books	  how	  voters	  disposed	  of	  their	  vote,	  and	  they	  would	  be	  scrutinised	  publicly,	  when	  making	  their	  choice,	  which	  was	  often	  expected	  to	  follow	  their	  employers’	  or	  landlords’	  suggestions.	  In	  return,	  voters	  could	  be	  rewarded	  with	  food,	  lodging	  or	  a	  small	  sum	  of	  money	  (O’Gorman	  2007).	  This	  process	  of	  voting	  appears	  to	  have	  embodied	  paternalist	  obligations,	  where	  votes	  were	  gifts	  or	  services	  in	  on-­‐going	  exchange	  relationships	  between	  voters	  and	  candidates.	  	  	  In	  Denmark,	  the	  introduction	  of	  the	  secret	  ballot	  in	  1901	  coincided	  with	  growing	  public	  support	  for	  the	  social	  democrats	  (the	  Danish	  equivalent	  of	  the	  labour	  party)	  and	  other	  working	  class	  parties	  (Elklit	  1988).	  The	  Danish	  political	  scientist	  Jørgen	  Elklit’s	  work	  suggests	  that	  this	  concurrence	  demonstrates	  how	  the	  secret	  ballot	  in	  Denmark	  made	  it	  possible	  for	  voters	  to	  cast	  their	  ballot	  as	  free	  individuals	  according	  to	  class	  interest.	  The	  secret	  ballot,	  it	  seems,	  liberated	  voters	  from	  the	  pressure	  to	  reciprocate	  the	  favours	  offered	  by	  a	  ‘patron’.	  A	  concomitant	  result	  of	  the	  secret	  ballot	  –	  at	  least	  in	  the	  UK	  –	  was	  that	  electoral	  patrons’	  influence	  over	  voters	  instead	  of	  being	  based	  in	  personal	  exchange	  became	  institutionalised	  in	  the	  bureaucratic	  structures	  of	  the	  large	  political	  parties	  (O’Gorman	  2007:	  33).	  The	  replacement	  of	  one	  type	  of	  institutional	  power	  for	  another	  meant	  that	  the	  polling	  booth	  was	  not	  only	  liberating,	  nor	  would	  it	  always	  fit	  into	  a	  neat	  narrative	  of	  progress	  (Coles	  2007:	  7).	  	  Today,	  the	  secret	  ballot	  is	  regarded	  as	  an	  unquestionable	  universal	  right	  in	  many	  countries.	  Yet,	  following	  the	  work	  of	  Strathern	  among	  others	  (1988),	  at	  least	  one	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of	  the	  particularities	  of	  the	  ballot	  can	  hardly	  be	  said	  to	  be	  universal	  –	  namely	  its	  reliance	  on	  the	  idea	  that	  individuals	  are	  the	  basic	  components	  of	  society.	  Indeed,	  the	  performance	  of	  the	  voting	  booth	  in	  singling	  out	  the	  voter	  as	  an	  individual	  is	  not	  a	  given.	  In	  Papua	  New	  Guinea	  (PNG)	  for	  example,	  it	  has	  been	  noted	  that	  during	  voting	  in	  the	  highlands	  provinces	  political	  supporters	  of	  candidates	  or	  the	  heads	  of	  kin-­‐groups	  would	  sometimes	  fill	  out	  all	  the	  ballot	  forms	  belonging	  to	  members	  of	  their	  group.	  The	  members	  were	  either	  intimidated	  to	  hand	  over	  their	  ballots	  (if	  they	  ever	  laid	  hands	  on	  them),	  or	  they	  did	  so	  due	  to	  social	  obligations	  (Gibbs	  2007:	  266-­‐267).	  Like	  the	  British	  elections	  of	  the	  19th	  century,	  a	  vote	  in	  PNG	  can	  also	  be	  a	  gift	  given	  to	  one’s	  candidate,	  for	  which	  something	  is	  expected	  in	  return.	  While	  the	  individual	  casting	  of	  ballots	  is	  enacted	  and	  respected	  in	  many	  other	  parts	  of	  PNG	  such	  as	  in	  Manus	  Province,	  some	  voters	  from	  this	  area	  have	  also	  expressed	  disappointment	  with	  the	  secret	  ballot,	  because	  it	  leads	  to	  the	  breakdown	  of	  transparency	  and	  thus	  reciprocity	  in	  exchange	  relations	  (Dalsgaard	  2010).	  	  	  The	  polling	  booth	  as	  a	  state-­‐created	  place	  is	  finally	  constituted	  by	  the	  practice	  that	  voters	  must	  leave	  any	  visible	  indications	  of	  political	  allegiances	  (especially	  support	  for	  a	  specific	  party)	  outside	  the	  polling	  place.	  The	  booth	  itself	  is	  likewise	  stripped	  of	  all	  materials	  apart	  from	  that	  directly	  relevant	  to	  the	  marking	  of	  the	  ballot,	  and	  it	  is	  illegal	  in	  most	  democracies	  to	  agitate	  politically	  next	  to	  polling	  stations	  (see	  Orr	  2015:	  118-­‐119).	  Individuals,	  while	  ideally	  capable	  of	  making	  free	  and	  independent	  choices,	  are	  still	  considered	  easily	  seducible,	  though,	  which	  is	  why	  the	  cutting	  of	  relations	  extends	  to	  these	  demands.	  The	  moment	  of	  marking	  the	  state-­‐endorsed	  ballot	  performs	  the	  ideal	  that	  no	  allegiances	  and	  obligations	  to	  competing	  social	  groups	  and	  authorities	  shall	  influence	  the	  voter.	  	  	  It	  is,	  of	  course,	  to	  some	  extent	  a	  fiction	  that	  voter’s	  can	  leave	  relationships	  and	  obligations	  outside	  the	  booth	  while	  casting	  a	  ballot,	  and	  despite	  the	  clear	  performative	  qualities	  of	  the	  idea	  (see	  Bertrand,	  Briquet	  &	  Pels	  2007),	  both	  meaning	  and	  ‘the	  social’	  do	  enter	  the	  booth	  through	  other	  means.	  Voting	  is	  an	  affective	  social	  act,	  which	  may	  be	  invested	  with	  personal	  feelings	  of	  agency	  (see	  Banerjee	  2011:	  93;	  Orr	  2015:	  124),	  and	  what	  is	  on	  the	  ballots	  certainly	  has	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meaningful	  effects	  for	  candidates	  in	  the	  election	  and	  subsequently	  for	  citizens	  subjected	  to	  those	  elected.	  The	  location	  of	  the	  booth	  itself	  also	  matters	  and	  may	  generate	  various	  sentiments	  (see	  Orr	  2015).	  For	  example,	  in	  rural	  areas	  of	  PNG	  voters	  may	  be	  deterred	  if	  polling	  is	  set	  up	  on	  the	  land	  of	  rival	  groups,	  whose	  ancestral	  spirits	  could	  then	  be	  present.	  In	  Denmark,	  we	  discovered	  during	  our	  fieldwork	  that	  the	  big	  crowds	  present	  at	  polling	  stations	  turn	  them	  into	  a	  frightening	  encounter	  for	  people	  suffering	  from	  various	  anxieties	  or	  phobias.	  In	  that	  respect,	  polling	  places	  can	  appear	  haunted	  in	  several	  ways.	  	  	  The	  polling	  booth	  thus	  gains	  meaning	  and	  relevance	  in	  relation	  to	  the	  particular	  place	  and	  electoral	  event	  of	  which	  it	  is	  part,	  and	  different	  polling	  booths	  even	  contain	  their	  own	  forms	  and	  characteristics	  dependent	  upon	  particular	  electoral	  traditions.	  The	  socio-­‐material	  design	  of	  the	  polling	  booth	  and	  the	  other	  technologies	  of	  the	  electoral	  process	  are	  thus	  highly	  localised	  (see	  Orr	  2015:	  109),	  and	  they	  are	  assumed	  to	  address	  the	  relationship	  between	  an	  electoral	  system	  and	  the	  democratic	  norms	  of	  a	  ‘culture’	  or	  a	  ‘society’,	  which	  this	  system	  is	  supposed	  to	  reflect	  or	  manage	  (e.g.	  Norris	  2004).	  In	  this	  sense	  the	  booth	  is	  place-­‐like	  in	  accordance	  with	  the	  Oxford	  English	  Dictionary’s	  definition	  of	  a	  place	  as	  a	  location	  or	  an	  area	  devoted	  to	  a	  specific	  (political	  and	  social)	  purpose	  –	  even	  if	  that	  purpose	  is	  temporary	  and	  in	  theory	  does	  not	  depend	  on	  any	  exact	  geographical	  spot.	  	  	  The	  polling	  booth	  is	  not	  simply	  a	  place	  in	  the	  traditional	  anthropological	  sense,	  where	  places	  are	  what	  they	  are	  due	  to	  the	  specific	  meanings	  ascribed	  to	  them	  by	  social	  groups	  and	  individuals,	  or	  due	  to	  the	  relationships	  they	  engender.	  We	  argue	  that	  the	  polling	  booth	  must	  also	  be	  seen	  as	  a	  generic	  place,	  concept	  or	  artefact	  (see	  Strathern	  2014).	  Like	  global	  phenomena,	  the	  generic	  refers	  to	  that	  which	  relies	  on	  no	  locality	  or	  singular	  place	  for	  its	  existence,	  even	  if	  it	  is	  always	  situated.	  As	  a	  generic	  place	  in	  democracies,	  the	  polling	  booth	  displays	  some	  of	  the	  qualities	  of	  what	  Marc	  Augé	  (1995)	  has	  called	  a	  ‘non-­‐place’	  –	  a	  non-­‐relational	  space,	  not	  concerned	  with	  identity	  except	  as	  categories	  or	  types	  (customers,	  passengers,	  citizens,	  voters	  etc.).	  It	  is	  a	  transit	  place,	  which	  connects	  and	  reconnects	  to	  other	  sites,	  and	  it	  is	  only	  concerned	  with	  people’s	  identities	  as	  they	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enter	  (or	  leave).	  Inside	  they	  are	  anonymous.	  The	  polling	  booth	  is	  a	  space,	  where	  the	  voter’s	  anonymised	  ballot	  is	  connected	  to	  the	  tallying	  bureaucracy,	  which	  produces	  an	  electoral	  result,	  but	  as	  a	  non-­‐place	  and	  as	  a	  generic,	  the	  booth	  has	  in	  common	  with	  other	  generic	  terms	  a	  certain	  capacity	  as	  generic	  in	  the	  ability	  to	  connect	  with	  other	  places	  and	  concepts	  covered	  by	  this	  term	  (see	  Strathern	  2014);	  a	  capacity	  partly	  achieved	  through	  the	  socio-­‐material	  stripping	  and	  cutting	  of	  localised	  meaning	  and	  relationships.	  	  	  
The	  polling	  booth	  as	  connected	  to	  an	  event	  As	  a	  result	  of	  being	  a	  temporary	  and	  localised	  technology,	  the	  polling	  booth	  cannot	  be	  separated	  from	  the	  event	  it	  co-­‐produces	  –	  the	  election.	  We	  connect	  place	  and	  event	  in	  our	  analytical	  frame	  in	  order	  to	  make	  explicit	  how	  the	  polling	  booth	  is	  already	  connected	  to	  issues	  that	  extend	  and	  endure	  beyond	  its	  spatial	  and	  temporal	  boundaries,	  and	  the	  challenge	  is	  to	  perform	  the	  cut	  that	  isolates	  the	  casting	  of	  ballots	  and	  the	  election	  itself	  from	  outside	  influences	  (cf.	  Coles	  2007).	  	  To	  reach	  an	  understanding	  of	  how	  event	  and	  place	  are	  mutually	  constituted	  and	  to	  what	  effect,	  we	  further	  emphasise	  the	  relation	  between	  human	  action,	  materiality	  and	  technology	  by	  drawing	  general	  inspiration	  from	  Marilyn	  Strathern’s	  argument	  that	  under	  certain	  circumstances	  one	  can	  regard	  artefacts	  as	  the	  enactment	  of	  events	  (1990:	  40).	  This	  perspective	  helps	  us	  pay	  attention	  to	  how	  social	  practices	  involve	  technologies	  and	  material	  conditions	  in	  the	  enactment	  of	  elections	  as	  democratic.	  How	  various	  forms	  of	  agency	  make	  (or	  cut)	  relations	  in	  turn	  helps	  us	  understand	  the	  making	  of	  the	  polling	  booth	  as	  a	  place.	  Historically	  it	  has	  been	  evident	  how	  the	  technological	  and	  material	  making	  of	  the	  polling	  booth	  may	  evoke	  debate	  and	  potentially	  destabilise	  taken-­‐for-­‐granted	  aspects	  of	  democracy.	  This	  was	  the	  case	  in	  Florida	  after	  the	  US	  presidential	  election	  in	  2000	  (see	  Miller	  2004),	  and	  the	  resistance	  to	  e-­‐voting	  in	  Denmark	  was	  voiced	  in	  a	  similar	  register	  of	  destabilisation.	  	  In	  the	  introduction	  to	  a	  special	  issue	  of	  the	  journal	  Social	  Analysis,	  Bruce	  Kapferer	  outlines	  how	  ‘the	  event’	  has	  been	  conceptualised	  in	  anthropology	  and	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in	  particular	  by	  the	  Manchester	  School	  (2010).	  According	  to	  Kapferer,	  the	  Mancunians,	  following	  Max	  Gluckman	  in	  his	  criticism	  of	  functionalism,	  began	  to	  focus	  on	  the	  importance	  of	  the	  atypical	  (if	  not	  the	  exceptional)	  such	  as	  incidents,	  which	  denoted	  crisis	  or	  conflict.	  Whereas	  functionalism	  had	  stressed	  events	  as	  representations	  of	  a	  social	  whole	  (structure)	  and	  hence	  focused	  on	  the	  typical	  which	  illustrated	  the	  structure	  (see	  also	  Strathern	  1990:	  38),	  Gluckman	  and	  the	  Mancunians	  rather	  wanted	  to	  appreciate	  challenges	  to	  taken-­‐for-­‐granted	  and	  routine	  social	  practices.	  This	  focus,	  they	  argued,	  would	  illuminate	  processes	  that	  produced	  equilibrium	  and	  stabilised	  a	  given	  state-­‐of-­‐affairs.	  They	  saw	  the	  social	  as	  characterised	  by	  change	  rather	  than	  by	  stability	  and	  structured	  order.2	  	  Following	  the	  Manchester	  School	  on	  how	  to	  understand	  the	  relation	  between	  stability	  and	  crisis,	  one	  could	  argue	  that	  elections	  are	  spaces	  of	  contestation	  as	  much	  as	  they	  are	  moments	  of	  national	  unity.	  Elections	  are	  –	  ideally	  –	  the	  destabilising	  moments	  in	  an	  otherwise	  fairly	  stable	  democratic	  structure	  –	  moments	  where	  everyone	  agrees	  to	  disagree	  about	  content	  (the	  distribution	  of	  parliamentary	  seats)	  but	  not	  about	  structure	  (representative	  democracy).	  This	  description	  seems	  to	  fit	  Denmark	  particularly	  well.	  In	  Denmark	  it	  is	  extremely	  rare	  that	  an	  election	  result	  is	  contested.	  Other	  countries,	  though,	  frequently	  see	  contestation	  of	  the	  result	  and	  even	  the	  methods	  of	  calculating	  it.	  The	  outcome	  in	  Florida	  is	  a	  case	  in	  point,	  but	  also	  the	  turmoil	  after	  the	  victory	  of	  Donald	  Trump	  in	  2016	  demonstrates	  how	  elections	  as	  events	  may	  even	  engender	  potential	  threats	  to	  the	  constitution	  of	  democracy	  and	  social	  order	  itself.	  	  Elections	  are	  not	  everyday	  occurrences.	  In	  Denmark	  they	  occur	  every	  other	  year	  on	  average.3	  As	  events	  they	  tend	  to	  entail	  extraordinary	  tasks	  and	  rhythms	  of	  work	  to	  the	  people	  involved.	  It	  was	  clear	  from	  our	  interviews	  and	  participant	  observation	  in	  the	  administration	  of	  polling	  places	  on	  Election	  Day	  that	  the	  municipal	  officials,	  who	  are	  responsible	  for	  the	  proper	  conduct	  and	  organisation	  of	  elections,	  perceive	  them	  as	  stressful	  periods	  requiring	  their	  full	  attention	  (see	  Vadgaard	  2016).	  Yet	  the	  practices	  that	  one	  can	  witness	  are	  in	  themselves	  often	  quite	  mundane,	  ordinary	  and	  appear	  to	  be	  instances	  of	  bureaucratic	  routine	  such	  as	  categorising,	  ordering,	  noting	  things	  down,	  keeping	  accounts,	  tallying	  and	  so	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on.	  Elections	  are	  thus	  in	  one	  way	  ‘atypical’	  events,	  but	  they	  do	  involve	  ‘typical’	  actions.	  According	  to	  several	  municipal	  workers	  we	  talked	  to,	  the	  typical	  bureaucratic	  actions	  can,	  nonetheless,	  be	  infused	  with	  a	  different	  sense	  of	  both	  seriousness	  and	  festivity,	  when	  they	  are	  related	  to	  the	  election.	  We	  were,	  for	  example,	  told	  how	  approving	  a	  postal	  vote	  in	  this	  way	  feels	  different	  from	  approving	  a	  passport	  or	  a	  driver’s	  licence	  in	  everyday	  bureaucratic	  work.	  	  In	  some	  important	  ways	  elections	  compare	  to	  how	  some	  of	  the	  early	  Mancunians’	  characterise	  the	  event	  and	  the	  relation	  between	  structure	  and	  anti-­‐structure	  –	  for	  instance	  Turner’s	  focus	  on	  the	  drama	  and	  ritual	  with	  its	  liminal	  periods	  or	  places	  (Turner	  1967,	  see	  also	  Kapferer	  2010:	  10)	  –	  or	  Handelman’s	  classification	  of	  different	  types	  of	  events	  based	  on	  institutionalisation	  and	  routinisation	  (Handelman	  1998,	  see	  Kapferer	  2010:	  11).	  As	  mentioned	  in	  our	  introduction,	  ‘a	  classic	  anthropological	  move	  would	  be	  to	  treat	  elections	  and	  specifically	  Election	  Day	  as	  a	  ritual.’	  (Coles	  2007:	  123);	  as	  state	  celebrations	  of	  democracy	  that	  invoke	  the	  inclusion	  of	  voters	  as	  full	  citizens,	  by	  which	  they	  confirm	  the	  relationship	  between	  state	  and	  society	  (see	  also	  Orr	  2015).	  Yet,	  whatever	  kinds	  of	  actions	  make	  up	  elections	  and	  whatever	  they	  signify,	  elections	  cannot	  be	  regarded	  as	  simply	  illustrations	  of	  structure,	  nor	  as	  exceptions	  and	  challenges	  to	  structure	  even	  if	  the	  way	  in	  which	  elections	  are	  constituted,	  confined	  and	  conducted	  addresses	  and	  produces	  imaginaries	  of	  the	  ‘larger	  issue’	  of	  democracy.	  According	  to	  Kapferer,	  events	  have	  been	  used	  in	  anthropology	  either	  as	  illustrations	  of	  descriptive	  or	  theoretical	  claims,	  or	  as	  happenings	  presenting	  slices	  of	  life	  or	  problems	  to	  be	  explained	  via	  ethnography.	  This	  would	  be	  one	  way	  to	  approach	  the	  generic	  election	  as	  event.	  However,	  we	  are	  also	  dealing	  with	  a	  more	  particular	  event	  in	  the	  particular	  context	  of	  our	  study	  –	  namely	  the	  aforementioned	  debate	  about	  digitalisation.	  In	  the	  discussions	  of	  e-­‐voting,	  contrasting	  imaginaries	  of	  democracy	  were	  emerging	  from	  the	  potential	  digitalisation	  as	  ‘a	  creative	  moment	  giving	  rise	  to	  new	  social	  and	  political	  potentials’	  (Kapferer	  2010:	  19).	  	  Hence	  in	  order	  to	  understand	  the	  importance	  of	  the	  different	  events	  and	  the	  importance	  of	  the	  polling	  booth	  as	  a	  place,	  we	  follow	  Kapferer	  in	  his	  Deleuzian-­‐
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inspired	  aim	  ‘toward	  the	  exploration	  of	  the	  event	  as	  singularity	  in	  which	  critical	  dimensions	  can	  be	  conceived	  as	  opening	  to	  new	  potentialities	  in	  the	  formation	  of	  social	  realities’	  (2010:	  1).	  With	  this	  statement	  Kapferer	  argues,	  in	  a	  move	  to	  take	  ambiguity	  and	  contradictions	  seriously	  while	  not	  assuming	  society	  to	  be	  a	  coherent	  totalised	  order	  (2010:	  15),	  that	  anthropology	  could	  take	  ‘the	  event	  as	  central	  to	  anthropological	  analysis	  rather	  than	  the	  concept	  of	  society’	  (2010:	  1).	  This	  way	  of	  thinking	  about	  events	  as	  generative	  moments	  allows	  Kapferer	  (and	  us)	  to	  bypass	  the	  dichotomies	  of	  typical/atypical	  and	  part/whole	  in	  relation	  to	  ‘a	  culture’	  or	  ‘a	  society’.	  The	  two	  events	  we	  discuss	  here	  –	  the	  election	  as	  a	  generic	  type	  of	  event	  and	  the	  debate	  about	  e-­‐voting	  as	  a	  particular	  one	  –	  both	  espouse	  generative	  potentialities	  and	  uncertainties,	  which	  should	  be	  further	  evident	  as	  we	  now	  return	  to	  the	  debate	  about	  a	  potential	  future	  digital	  polling	  booth.	  
	  
Preparing	  for	  the	  digital	  polling	  booth	  In	  the	  debate	  about	  e-­‐voting	  in	  Denmark	  it	  was	  the	  bounding	  of	  the	  polling	  booth,	  and	  thus	  the	  ideal	  of	  temporarily	  cutting	  social	  relationships	  to	  produce	  the	  secret	  ballot	  as	  discussed	  above,	  which	  was	  at	  stake.	  All	  the	  actors	  involved	  agreed	  that	  the	  isolation	  of	  the	  voter	  from	  external	  influence	  is	  a	  crucial	  aspect	  of	  democratic	  elections,	  but	  whereas	  proponents	  of	  e-­‐voting	  believed	  that	  the	  cutting	  of	  relationships	  would	  be	  retained	  using	  new	  digital	  technologies,	  opponents	  argued	  that	  it	  would	  not.	  The	  boundary-­‐making	  potential	  of	  the	  polling	  booth	  itself	  became	  a	  site	  of	  struggle	  in	  the	  face	  of	  digitalisation.	  	  	  We	  gained	  access	  to	  the	  empirical	  details	  of	  this	  debate	  as	  members	  of	  the	  research	  project	  XXXX,	  where	  we	  collaborated	  with	  computer	  scientists	  in	  studying	  how	  digitalisation	  challenges	  or	  outright	  transforms	  democracy	  in	  Denmark.	  Originally	  the	  overall	  aim	  of	  the	  project	  was	  to	  investigate	  and	  participate	  in	  the	  introduction	  of	  e-­‐voting	  technologies	  to	  Danish	  elections	  by	  designing	  and	  conducting	  experiments	  with	  such	  technologies,	  exactly	  as	  L132	  would	  have	  allowed	  for.	  Ethnographic	  studies	  of	  the	  organisation	  and	  practical	  conduct	  of	  elections	  was	  supposed	  to	  inform	  the	  software	  design	  and	  testing	  of	  the	  technologies	  by	  our	  computer	  science	  collaborators.	  The	  research	  was	  then	  ultimately	  meant	  to	  provide	  decision-­‐makers	  with	  insights	  of	  whether	  it	  was	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possible	  to	  ‘modernise’	  the	  electoral	  process	  without	  jeopardizing	  fundamental	  democratic	  principles.	  However,	  before	  having	  achieved	  any	  substantial	  research	  results,	  the	  project	  team	  was	  called	  upon	  by	  the	  Ministry	  to	  give	  consultation	  on	  the	  process	  of	  writing	  L132	  and	  to	  comment	  on	  suggestions	  for	  technological	  solutions.	  Our	  discussion	  thus	  builds	  on	  the	  insights	  we	  have	  gained	  from	  being	  entangled	  in	  the	  process	  itself,	  which	  has	  included	  numerous	  formal	  and	  informal	  interviews	  as	  well	  as	  participant	  observation	  in	  elections,	  in	  meetings	  with	  stakeholders	  and	  in	  joint	  public	  communication	  of	  the	  state-­‐of-­‐the-­‐art	  within	  the	  different	  research	  fields	  encompassed	  by	  the	  project.	  	  The	  law	  proposal	  drafted	  by	  the	  Ministry	  of	  Economic	  Affairs	  and	  the	  Interior	  did	  not	  intend	  to	  do	  away	  with	  the	  boundaries	  of	  the	  polling	  booth	  or	  with	  those	  of	  the	  election	  as	  event.	  Voters	  would	  still	  be	  required	  to	  arrive	  in	  a	  polling	  place	  and	  enter	  a	  secluded	  area,	  where	  they	  would	  cast	  their	  vote	  as	  individualised	  voters	  as	  usual.	  Instead	  of	  marking	  a	  paper	  ballot	  directly,	  they	  would	  now	  be	  using	  a	  digital	  device	  (Folketinget	  2012-­‐13).	  Many	  details	  of	  how	  the	  voting	  could	  or	  should	  be	  done	  digitally	  was,	  however,	  left	  unspecified	  in	  L132	  in	  order	  to	  allow	  private	  vendors	  flexibility	  during	  a	  public	  procurement	  process.	  During	  the	  process	  of	  public	  hearings,	  arguments	  defending	  L132	  nonetheless	  frequently	  ended	  up	  explaining	  how	  the	  technology	  could	  be	  specified.	  For	  example,	  most	  commentators	  assumed	  that	  the	  voter	  would	  choose	  a	  candidate	  or	  a	  party	  on	  a	  computer	  screen	  and	  print	  a	  ballot	  as	  a	  receipt,	  which	  should	  then	  be	  dropped	  into	  a	  ballot	  box	  as	  before	  (e.g.	  Kildebogaard	  2013a;	  Vestager	  2013).	  	  	  In	  presenting	  and	  defending	  L132	  in	  Parliament,	  the	  Minister	  for	  Economic	  Affairs	  and	  the	  Interior	  argued	  that	  e-­‐voting	  provided	  multiple	  advantages	  (Folketinget	  2012-­‐13;	  Folketinget	  2013).	  These	  included	  quick	  and	  accurate	  tallying	  of	  votes,	  alleged	  costs-­‐savings	  as	  well	  as	  increased	  accessibility	  for	  disadvantaged	  voters.	  The	  vision	  shared	  by	  the	  government,	  the	  municipalities	  and	  other	  proponents	  (most	  discernibly	  the	  Danish	  Association	  of	  the	  Physical	  Disabled),	  was	  that	  digitalisation	  would	  simply	  be	  a	  motor	  for	  optimising	  the	  existing	  process	  to	  make	  it	  cheaper,	  faster,	  more	  accurate	  and	  more	  inclusive	  (Gad	  &	  Dalsgaard	  2015).	  The	  minister,	  Margrethe	  Vestager,	  especially	  stressed	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the	  importance	  of	  the	  democratic	  principle	  of	  access	  and	  inclusion.	  E-­‐voting	  would	  give	  ‘people	  with	  different	  disabilities	  […]	  a	  completely	  different	  access	  to	  voting	  just	  like	  us,	  who	  do	  not	  have	  a	  handicap’	  (Folketinget	  2013,	  11:29).4	  The	  other	  aspects	  were	  to	  the	  minister	  ‘practical	  issues’	  (ibid.),	  while	  the	  challenge	  of	  the	  bounding	  of	  the	  booth	  was	  ‘technical’,	  a	  view	  also	  characterising	  the	  statements	  made	  by	  other	  government	  spokespersons	  in	  the	  debate.	  	  	  Computer	  experts	  opposed	  to	  L132	  contested	  the	  claims	  to	  the	  efficiency	  of	  e-­‐voting	  as	  either	  naïve,	  ideological,	  practically	  unfeasible	  or	  as	  creating	  too	  many	  uncertainties	  and	  risks.	  E-­‐voting	  was	  to	  them	  a	  solution	  without	  a	  problem.	  The	  potential	  security	  risks	  as	  well	  as	  the	  uncertain	  costs	  were	  repeated	  by	  Michael	  Aastrup	  –	  spokesperson	  for	  the	  large	  right-­‐wing	  liberal	  party	  Venstre	  –	  as	  a	  reason	  for	  the	  withdrawal	  of	  his	  party’s	  support	  for	  L132	  (Kildebogaard	  2013b).	  Other	  concerned	  members	  of	  the	  public	  or	  of	  Parliament	  argued	  that	  control	  of	  the	  elections	  would	  be	  delegated	  to	  an	  IT-­‐savvy	  elite	  at	  the	  cost	  of	  public	  transparency	  and	  scrutiny	  of	  the	  electoral	  process	  as	  a	  democratic	  principle.	  Stine	  Brix,	  a	  member	  of	  the	  left-­‐wing	  party	  Enhedslisten	  stated	  that	  it	  was	  crucial	  that	  ‘you	  as	  a	  citizen	  can	  ascertain	  what	  happens	  to	  your	  vote’	  and	  she	  praised	  the	  current	  system,	  where	  the	  election	  ‘takes	  place	  because	  of	  ordinary	  citizens,	  who	  act	  as	  electoral	  observers.’	  (Meister	  2013).	  	  	  When	  the	  advantage	  of	  e-­‐voting	  to	  people	  with	  impaired	  vision	  or	  other	  disabilities	  were	  mentioned	  (the	  only	  reason	  for	  e-­‐voting	  that	  no	  one	  could	  really	  oppose),	  the	  response	  was	  that	  e-­‐voting	  would	  not	  so	  much	  enable	  the	  disadvantaged	  voters,	  as	  it	  would	  disable	  ordinary	  voters	  by	  alienating	  them	  from	  understanding	  the	  process	  (Gad	  &	  Dalsgaard	  2015).	  A	  frequently	  heard	  line	  of	  commenting	  was	  that	  ‘one	  thing	  is	  whether	  IT-­‐security	  people	  can	  recognise	  whether	  the	  e-­‐voting	  solution	  is	  secure	  enough.	  Something	  else	  is	  whether	  the	  ordinary	  Dane	  can	  feel	  certain	  that	  the	  system	  does,	  what	  it	  is	  supposed	  to’	  (Meister	  2013).	  Such	  lack	  of	  transparency	  could	  –	  it	  was	  argued	  –	  mean	  that	  ‘the	  voters	  lose	  trust	  in	  the	  election,	  and	  abstain	  from	  voting’	  as	  one	  reader	  of	  
Version2	  wrote	  in	  a	  comment	  directly	  addressing	  the	  representatives	  of	  the	  Danish	  handicap	  organisations	  (see	  Meister	  2013).	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  The	  discursive	  construction	  of	  the	  imaginary	  of	  a	  digital	  booth	  was	  thus	  a	  challenge	  to	  the	  above-­‐mentioned	  binary	  of	  generic	  and	  particular.	  The	  digital	  booth	  never	  came	  into	  actual	  existence	  but	  it	  was	  nonetheless	  a	  generative	  moment	  (Kapferer	  2010)	  in	  the	  democratic	  debate	  about	  digitalisation	  and	  voting.	  The	  controversy	  pointed	  towards	  a	  shared	  concern	  for	  democratic	  principles,	  which	  everyone	  involved	  seemed	  to	  subscribe	  to,	  but	  also	  towards	  disagreements	  about	  which	  norms	  were	  the	  most	  important	  (security,	  transparency	  and	  trust	  versus	  inclusion),	  and	  whether	  they	  could	  be	  equally	  guaranteed	  with	  a	  digital	  polling	  booth.	  This	  was	  also	  a	  disagreement	  over	  what	  new	  democratic	  institutions	  Denmark	  would	  need,	  if	  the	  continued	  trustworthiness	  of	  the	  process	  were	  to	  become	  more	  reliant	  on	  computer	  science	  expertise.	  According	  to	  opponents,	  digitalisation	  would	  seriously	  transform	  the	  voting	  process	  and	  the	  democratic	  principles	  guaranteed	  by	  the	  current	  socio-­‐material	  design	  of	  the	  polling	  booth.	  The	  principles	  and	  the	  practical	  issues	  could	  not	  be	  as	  easily	  separated	  –	  at	  least	  not	  through	  digitalisation	  alone.	  	  
The	  risks	  of	  e-­‐voting	  The	  computer	  experts	  opposing	  L132	  primarily	  came	  from	  a	  particular	  community	  debating	  through	  Version2,	  an	  online	  IT-­‐professional	  news-­‐site	  maintained	  by	  the	  engineering	  journal	  Ingeniøren	  (‘The	  Engineer’).	  Version2	  arranged	  public	  meetings,	  discussed	  passionately	  with	  politicians	  and	  others	  online	  on	  the	  Version2	  blogs	  (see	  Sandal	  2015),	  and	  voiced	  their	  concerns	  at	  an	  expert	  workshop	  about	  the	  suggested	  system	  and	  at	  a	  hearing	  about	  L132	  in	  parliament.	  The	  opposition	  to	  L132	  drew	  upon	  discussions	  of	  past	  international	  experiments	  with	  e-­‐voting	  as	  well	  as	  discussions	  in	  computer	  science	  circles	  about	  e-­‐voting	  technologies.5	  Proponents	  such	  as	  the	  political	  spokesperson	  for	  the	  Social	  Democrats,	  the	  largest	  party	  in	  the	  government	  coalition	  behind	  L132,	  would	  claim	  that	  ‘There	  are	  already	  well-­‐developed	  and	  tested	  systems	  on	  the	  market,	  which	  we	  could	  make	  use	  of	  in	  Denmark.	  It	  makes	  the	  same	  high	  demands	  to	  security	  and	  anonymity	  as	  we	  know	  today,	  but	  at	  the	  same	  time	  they	  are	  much	  more	  effective.’	  (Folketinget	  2013,	  10:28).	  Opponents	  would	  counter	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this	  by	  referring	  to	  numerous	  technical	  reports	  and	  investigations	  arguing	  on	  the	  contrary	  that	  the	  digital	  voting	  technologies	  developed	  by	  private	  vendors	  were	  easy	  to	  jeopardise	  (see	  Saltman	  2006;	  Jones	  &	  Simons	  2012).	  We	  will	  review	  the	  key	  aspects	  of	  these	  discussions,	  since	  they	  clarify	  the	  different	  problems	  with	  an	  unbounded	  polling	  booth.	  	  	  Many	  computer	  scientists	  have	  for	  years	  been	  vehemently	  critical	  of	  e-­‐voting	  (e.g.	  Simons	  &	  Jones	  2012).	  The	  criticism	  is	  frequently	  focused	  on	  the	  magnitude	  of	  ‘risk’	  and	  ‘security	  issues’.	  Digitalisation	  would	  mean	  for	  instance	  that	  hackers,	  if	  they	  gain	  access	  to	  the	  vulnerable	  nodes	  in	  the	  network,	  would	  be	  able	  to	  manipulate	  not	  just	  one	  ballot	  but	  multiple	  or	  even	  all	  ballots.	  The	  fear	  that	  Russian	  hackers	  should	  have	  managed	  to	  compromise	  digital	  ballots	  in	  key	  states	  during	  the	  2016	  US	  presidential	  election	  is	  a	  pertinent	  example.	  Shortly	  after	  the	  election,	  Alex	  Halderman,	  a	  prominent	  computer	  scientist	  with	  expertise	  in	  security	  and	  privacy	  issues	  of	  e-­‐voting,	  signed	  an	  affidavit	  in	  support	  of	  scrutinising	  the	  ballot-­‐casting	  machinery	  in	  the	  state	  of	  Wisconsin	  (Wisconsin	  Elections	  Commission	  2016).	  Even	  if	  no	  digital	  tampering	  took	  place,	  the	  possibility	  that	  it	  could	  happen	  threw	  the	  integrity	  of	  the	  election	  into	  question	  and	  demonstrated	  the	  vulnerability	  of	  both	  the	  voting	  technologies	  and	  US	  electoral	  system	  itself	  (e.g.	  The	  Associated	  Press	  2016).	  	  	  Experts	  in	  cryptography	  and	  computer	  security	  often	  frame	  the	  challenge	  in	  terms	  of	  fighting	  ‘adversaries’,	  and	  they	  speculate	  about	  how	  security	  can	  be	  compromised	  by	  hacking	  as	  well	  as	  insider	  attacks,	  but	  also	  due	  to	  simple	  bugs	  in	  the	  code	  or	  the	  protocol	  or	  mistakes	  by	  users	  (see	  Springall	  et	  al.	  2014;	  Stenerud	  &	  Bull	  2012).	  Some	  have	  called	  for	  alternative	  strategies	  and	  design	  schemes	  to	  eliminate	  the	  risks	  of	  hacking.	  Examples	  include	  open	  source	  software	  which	  makes	  it	  possible	  for	  independent	  actors	  to	  verify	  systems,	  and	  decentralised	  protocols	  so	  that	  the	  electoral	  system	  as	  a	  whole	  cannot	  be	  hijacked	  (e.g.	  Frénot,	  Grumbach	  &	  Reimert	  2014),6	  but	  the	  preferred	  solution	  is	  to	  retain	  paper	  ballots	  that	  allow	  for	  a	  manual	  recount	  (Halderman	  2016).	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The	  general	  concern	  among	  the	  computer	  scientists	  working	  with	  voting	  technologies	  is	  that	  the	  integrity	  of	  elections	  depends	  on	  a	  balance	  between	  transparency	  and	  privacy	  (see	  Springall	  et	  al.	  2014).	  In	  this	  context,	  transparency	  refers	  to	  how	  everyone	  in	  principle	  should	  be	  able	  to	  check	  that	  their	  own	  ballot	  is	  accepted	  as	  a	  formal	  vote,	  that	  all	  ballots	  are	  counted	  properly,	  and	  that	  the	  election	  result	  can	  be	  verified.	  Privacy	  on	  the	  other	  hand	  refers	  to	  the	  secrecy	  of	  the	  ballot	  and	  how	  the	  individual	  voter’s	  choice	  is	  respected.	  This	  is	  important	  not	  the	  least	  when	  voters	  have	  to	  trust	  others	  –	  a	  third	  party	  or	  a	  technology	  –	  to	  guarantee	  that	  the	  result	  reflects	  the	  ballots	  cast.	  As	  a	  compromise	  between	  transparency	  and	  privacy,	  which	  eliminates	  the	  need	  to	  trust	  other	  human	  actors	  directly,	  computer	  scientists	  have	  attempted	  to	  construct	  systems,	  where	  individual	  voters	  can	  verify	  how	  they	  voted	  and	  that	  their	  own	  vote	  is	  counted	  towards	  the	  result,	  but	  without	  being	  able	  to	  interfere	  with	  or	  check	  what	  others	  have	  voted.	  This	  is	  frequently	  referred	  to	  as	  ‘end-­‐to-­‐end	  verifiability’	  or	  ‘E2E’	  (see	  for	  example	  www.pretavoter.com).	  	  This	  concern	  about	  getting	  the	  balance	  between	  privacy	  and	  transparency	  right	  is	  related	  to	  a	  common	  argument	  against	  Internet	  elections	  in	  particular,	  namely	  that	  voting	  via	  the	  Internet	  demolishes	  the	  secret	  ballot	  as	  the	  fundamental	  premise	  of	  democratic	  elections.	  This	  central	  premise	  –	  for	  the	  voter	  to	  choose	  independently	  and	  free	  from	  intimidation	  or	  obligations	  –	  is	  reconfigured,	  when	  ballots	  are	  not	  cast	  in	  the	  state-­‐controlled	  space	  of	  the	  polling	  booth,	  which	  ensures	  the	  cutting	  of	  relationships.	  Votes	  can	  be	  taken,	  given,	  bought,	  sold	  or	  exchanged	  as	  soon	  the	  filling	  out	  of	  the	  ballot	  is	  subject	  to	  witnessing.	  For	  the	  Norwegian	  experiments	  with	  Internet	  elections	  in	  2011	  and	  2013,	  the	  government	  tried	  to	  remedy	  the	  risk	  of	  intimidation	  and	  vote-­‐selling	  by	  permitting	  voters	  to	  cast	  as	  many	  digital	  ballots	  as	  they	  liked,	  and	  even	  to	  turn	  up	  on	  Election	  Day	  and	  cast	  a	  ballot	  manually.	  The	  latest	  cast	  ballot	  would	  override	  the	  others.	  In	  this	  way	  a	  ballot	  cast	  under	  pressure	  could	  (ideally)	  be	  changed	  without	  the	  intimidating	  or	  bribing	  agent	  knowing	  it.7	  	  But	  why	  were	  both	  digital	  tampering	  and	  the	  potential	  demolition	  of	  the	  secret	  ballot	  a	  controversy	  in	  Denmark,	  when	  the	  law	  proposal	  suggested	  maintaining	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the	  polling	  booth	  and	  the	  traditional	  physical	  separation	  of	  the	  individual	  voter	  during	  the	  process	  of	  casting	  the	  ballot?	  As	  mentioned,	  the	  law	  proposal	  did	  not	  permit	  Internet	  elections;	  it	  merely	  permitted	  the	  use	  of	  voting	  terminals	  or	  computers	  in	  the	  polling	  places,	  and	  it	  suggested	  that	  the	  use	  of	  e-­‐voting	  was	  merely	  experimentation.	  Polling	  officials	  would	  still	  be	  around	  to	  observe	  the	  process	  and	  to	  ensure	  that	  everything	  worked	  and	  everyone	  followed	  the	  procedures.	  	  	  Firstly,	  some	  computer	  experts	  argued	  that	  even	  if	  the	  machines	  were	  not	  online,	  the	  separation	  of	  voter	  and	  vote	  could	  not	  be	  guaranteed	  if	  a	  digital	  system	  mediated	  the	  process,	  nor	  could	  it	  be	  guaranteed	  that	  the	  separation	  would	  be	  irreversible.	  The	  software	  on	  machines	  needs	  frequent	  updates	  where	  the	  computer	  is	  either	  connected	  to	  a	  network	  or	  receives	  transfers	  via	  USB	  or	  memory	  cards	  that	  can	  potentially	  be	  infected	  with	  malware	  (see	  Halderman	  2016).	  	  	  Secondly,	  to	  counter	  digital	  tampering	  the	  system	  would	  as	  a	  minimum	  need	  an	  independent	  and	  preferably	  non-­‐digital	  set	  of	  checks	  and	  balances.	  However,	  this	  would	  open	  up	  for	  disputes	  concerning	  which	  version	  of	  the	  vote	  would	  be	  the	  legitimate	  one.	  In	  case	  the	  digital	  and	  the	  printed	  versions	  differed	  (or	  if	  two	  different	  digital	  versions	  differed),	  it	  would	  be	  necessary	  to	  have	  determined	  beforehand	  which	  manifestation	  of	  the	  ballot	  cast	  should	  be	  deemed	  the	  valid	  one.	  In	  paper-­‐based	  electoral	  processes,	  the	  paper	  ballots	  are	  destroyed	  after	  the	  election	  in	  order	  to	  put	  an	  end	  to	  the	  event	  and	  to	  prevent	  future	  disputes	  that	  would	  threaten	  social	  order.	  With	  e-­‐voting	  no	  one	  could	  guarantee	  that	  the	  voters’	  choices	  would	  not	  be	  manipulated	  or	  retrievable	  from	  either	  software	  or	  hardware	  after	  the	  election	  despite	  state-­‐of-­‐the-­‐art	  digital	  cryptography	  depending	  on	  how	  it	  is	  stored	  or	  discarded.	  The	  technology	  would	  potentially	  contain	  traces	  of	  voters’	  identities	  and	  how	  they	  had	  voted.	  Even	  if	  the	  identity	  of	  the	  voters	  and	  information	  about	  their	  votes	  could	  be	  appropriately	  protected	  in	  the	  present,	  could	  such	  protection	  also	  be	  guaranteed	  for	  eternity?8	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Thirdly,	  sorting	  out	  private	  versus	  public	  ownership	  of	  the	  technology	  as	  part	  of	  the	  general	  electoral	  infrastructure,	  and	  who	  would	  hold	  responsibility	  for	  implementing	  and	  running	  it,	  could	  also	  be	  problematic.	  Even	  if	  purchased	  by	  the	  state,	  control	  of	  the	  technology	  could	  in	  theory	  still	  lie	  with	  the	  company,	  which	  originally	  constructed	  it,	  rather	  than	  with	  polling	  officials	  and	  voters.	  Several	  companies	  constructing	  e-­‐voting	  systems	  have	  refused	  to	  disclose	  their	  source	  codes	  due	  to	  commercial	  interests.	  This	  may	  facilitate	  ‘security	  by	  obscurity’	  but	  it	  also	  leaves	  both	  the	  public	  and	  the	  polling	  administrators	  in	  the	  dark	  about	  how	  the	  various	  digitalised	  processes	  work	  (see	  Lessig	  2006:	  141-­‐43;	  Kelty	  2009:	  201;	  Oostveen	  2010).	  	  	  Finally,	  L132	  did	  not	  suggest	  when	  experiments	  would	  end	  and	  based	  on	  what	  criteria	  they	  would	  be	  judged.	  The	  ministry	  would	  have	  full	  discretionary	  power	  to	  continually	  approve	  or	  disapprove	  of	  changes	  to	  the	  digital	  system,	  which	  would	  give	  the	  ministry	  full	  control	  of	  the	  electoral	  process	  for	  an	  indeterminate	  period.	  Experiments	  could	  in	  principle	  continue	  forever.	  	  These	  concerns	  show	  how	  the	  physical	  polling	  booth’s	  capacity	  for	  temporarily	  cutting	  relationships	  could	  be	  dissolved	  in	  many	  ways.	  As	  it	  was	  conceived,	  the	  digital	  polling	  technology	  would	  potentially	  carry	  unwanted	  and	  invisible	  present	  and	  future	  relationships	  manipulating	  both	  individual	  votes	  and	  the	  election	  at	  large.	  	  All	  in	  all,	  the	  prospect	  of	  a	  digital	  polling	  booth	  had	  been	  like	  opening	  a	  can	  of	  worms.	  Possibly	  the	  most	  general	  issue	  was	  the	  transparency	  of	  the	  system	  and	  the	  shift	  to	  reliance	  on	  expert	  control	  at	  the	  cost	  of	  the	  participation	  of	  voters	  in	  democracy	  –	  not	  only	  as	  voters	  casting	  a	  ballot	  but	  also	  as	  overseers	  of	  the	  electoral	  process	  in	  general,	  since	  polling	  officials	  in	  Denmark	  traditionally	  have	  been	  grassroots	  party	  members	  and	  thus	  ‘ordinary	  citizens’.	  The	  error-­‐prone	  humans,	  who	  were	  to	  be	  replaced	  by	  the	  accurate	  technology	  (e.g.	  for	  tallying),	  were	  exactly	  seen	  as	  democratically	  guaranteeing	  the	  integrity	  of	  the	  manual	  process	  through	  their	  localised	  participation,	  as	  stated	  by	  Stine	  Brix	  above.	  While	  many	  politicians	  and	  computer	  scientists	  (even	  opponents	  of	  L132)	  were	  able	  to	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imagine	  a	  range	  of	  technological	  solutions	  for	  specific	  parts	  of	  the	  electoral	  process,	  it	  was	  much	  harder	  to	  envision	  what	  new	  institutions	  and	  demonstrations	  of	  transparency	  would	  have	  to	  be	  established	  as	  a	  result	  of	  digitalisation,	  or	  what	  would	  emerge	  as	  unintended	  results.	  Hence	  the	  fears	  that	  ‘trust’	  in	  the	  electoral	  process	  would	  dissipate.	  	  
Concluding	  comments:	  What	  kind	  of	  ethnographic	  site	  is	  the	  polling	  booth?	  Focusing	  on	  the	  controversy	  of	  the	  digital	  bounding	  of	  the	  polling	  booth	  offers	  an	  ethnographic	  access	  point	  for	  understanding	  how	  different	  meanings	  of	  what	  is	  considered	  ‘democratic’	  are	  generated	  through	  the	  destabilisation	  of	  an	  otherwise	  stable	  generic	  place	  (the	  polling	  booth).	  Our	  ethnographic	  study	  thus	  elicits	  multiple	  spatial	  as	  well	  as	  temporal	  scales	  in	  the	  making	  of	  the	  field,	  from	  the	  recurrence	  of	  elections	  as	  moments	  and	  events	  to	  the	  generic	  character	  of	  the	  polling	  booth	  as	  a	  (non-­‐)place	  (cf.	  Dalsgaard	  &	  Nielsen	  2013).	  However,	  the	  uncertain	  boundaries	  which	  matter	  to	  some	  of	  our	  informants,	  indicates	  to	  us	  where	  scale	  and	  connection	  is	  under	  negotiation;	  following	  the	  concerns	  of	  informants	  about	  the	  digital	  unbounding	  brings	  its	  own	  bounding	  of	  our	  field-­‐site.	  	  Consequently,	  the	  controversy	  invites	  us	  on	  the	  one	  hand	  to	  consider	  how	  the	  polling	  booth	  acts	  as	  a	  socially	  and	  materially	  bounded	  place	  both	  empirically	  and	  analytically.	  The	  apparent	  small	  size	  of	  the	  place	  and	  the	  brevity	  of	  the	  period	  in	  question	  do	  not	  really	  aid	  the	  ethnographic	  task	  of	  figuring	  this	  out.	  The	  isolating	  capacity	  of	  the	  analogue	  polling	  booth	  poses	  a	  particular	  problem	  in	  that	  it	  does	  not	  lend	  itself	  easily	  to	  inside	  participant	  observation	  (apart	  from	  allowing	  the	  ethnographer	  to	  do	  what	  all	  voters	  are	  supposed	  to	  do	  –	  to	  cast	  a	  ballot	  in	  private),	  and	  since	  the	  duration	  of	  the	  event	  (the	  election)	  is	  rather	  brief,	  one	  has	  to	  rely	  on	  its	  periodic	  and	  recurring	  nature	  to	  make	  further	  observations	  and	  ask	  further	  questions.	  The	  advantage	  is	  that	  the	  secret	  ballot	  has	  been	  a	  stable	  generic	  entity	  in	  Denmark	  for	  more	  than	  a	  100	  years,	  and	  the	  small	  changes	  that	  have	  occurred	  are	  documented	  in	  public	  archives.	  Participant	  observation	  related	  to	  the	  polling	  booth	  can	  thus	  occur	  ‘displaced’	  in	  time	  and	  space	  at	  any	  election,	  and	  we	  can	  follow	  discourses	  over	  time	  and	  from	  site	  to	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site	  as	  the	  field	  comes	  into	  being	  as	  a	  recurring	  event	  (cf.	  Coleman	  2010).	  In	  other	  words,	  one	  does	  not	  have	  to	  be	  inside	  or	  even	  to	  visit	  any	  polling	  booth	  in	  particular	  to	  understand	  what	  is	  taking	  place,	  and	  how	  the	  cutting	  of	  relationships	  works.	  	  Conversely,	  our	  small	  place	  is	  thus	  on	  the	  other	  hand	  only	  a	  small	  part	  of	  what	  is	  really	  ‘the	  field’	  here	  (see	  Mitchell	  2010).	  Studying	  elections	  and	  electoral	  practices	  is	  about	  much	  more	  than	  what	  happens	  in	  the	  brief	  time	  it	  takes	  someone	  to	  cast	  a	  ballot.	  This	  action	  connects	  to	  many	  other	  places	  and	  actions	  beyond	  the	  polling	  booth	  (see	  Coles	  2007;	  Banerjee	  2011),	  and	  digitalisation	  makes	  it	  clear	  that	  what	  takes	  place	  within	  the	  booth	  cannot	  be	  understood	  in	  spatial	  or	  temporal	  isolation,	  but	  must	  involve	  attention	  to	  democratic	  and	  technological	  debates	  as	  they	  unfold	  (in	  parliament,	  in	  expert	  colloquia,	  in	  the	  media,	  and	  in	  the	  organisations	  that	  manage	  elections)	  as	  much	  as	  to	  their	  socio-­‐material	  character.	  As	  a	  form	  of	  event,	  elections	  express	  and	  constitute	  political	  stakes	  in	  a	  society,	  and	  they	  are	  related	  to	  culturally	  specific	  ideals	  about	  what	  is	  considered	  democratic	  in	  terms	  of	  inclusion,	  transparency	  etc.,	  which	  the	  Danish	  e-­‐voting	  debate	  demonstrated.	  Design	  or	  engineering	  of	  electoral	  systems	  (e.g.	  proportional	  systems	  versus	  first-­‐past-­‐the-­‐post)	  are	  frequently	  meant	  to	  mirror	  political	  fractions	  and	  traditions	  as	  much	  as	  what	  the	  populace	  generally	  considers	  to	  be	  a	  fair	  representation	  of	  these,	  but	  designs	  or	  rules	  are	  often	  introduced	  or	  revised	  in	  the	  hope	  that	  they	  will	  affect	  or	  even	  ‘improve’	  voting	  behavior	  –	  whatever	  that	  might	  mean	  (see	  Norris	  2004).	  In	  doing	  so	  an	  electoral	  system	  is	  nonetheless	  expected	  to	  live	  up	  to	  certain	  –	  universal	  –	  principles	  and	  definitions	  of	  what	  constitutes	  the	  people.	  While	  trying	  to	  match	  demographic	  ideals	  of	  a	  population	  or	  a	  society,	  the	  designs	  of	  electoral	  systems	  are	  still	  hardly	  typifying	  of	  or	  reducible	  to	  any	  particular	  social	  structure,	  nor	  to	  any	  (larger)	  area,	  region,	  country	  or	  culture.	  The	  place	  (the	  polling	  booth)	  in	  our	  case	  thus	  does	  not	  add	  up	  to	  or	  represent	  a	  ‘culture’	  (Coleman	  2010:	  172).	  Rather	  the	  polling	  booth	  works	  as	  a	  social	  device	  that	  can	  connect	  or	  cut	  relationships	  in	  a	  manner	  that	  both	  constitutes	  and	  fits	  the	  agreed-­‐upon	  democratic	  principles	  and	  values	  of	  a	  given	  society	  or	  community,	  and	  as	  a	  generic	  it	  allows	  such	  societies	  or	  communities	  to	  recognise	  and	  relate	  to	  each	  other	  as	  democratic.	  The	  polling	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booth	  is	  much	  smaller	  than	  the	  kind	  of	  place	  usually	  thought	  of	  as	  a	  field,	  but	  as	  should	  be	  obvious	  by	  now,	  our	  point	  is	  not	  that	  the	  polling	  place	  is	  the	  physical	  location,	  where	  the	  ethnographer	  should	  be	  located	  (cf.	  Gupta	  and	  Ferguson	  1997).	  The	  point	  is	  rather	  to	  understand	  how	  even	  a	  place	  as	  small	  as	  the	  polling	  booth	  consists	  of	  heterogeneous	  processes,	  discourses	  and	  relationships	  –	  including	  how	  the	  ethnographer	  takes	  part	  in	  this	  making	  by	  following	  the	  way	  various	  actors	  struggle	  with	  how	  and	  where	  its	  boundaries	  are	  created.	  The	  place	  itself	  may	  be	  filled	  with	  meanings	  referring	  to	  other	  –	  often	  less	  visible	  –	  actors.	  This	  was	  especially	  the	  case	  with	  the	  digital	  polling	  booth.	  The	  analogue	  polling	  booth	  performs	  isolation	  but	  generic	  relations,	  whereas	  the	  digital	  booth	  threatens	  to	  reconnect	  not	  to	  local	  place	  but	  to	  an	  unknown	  number	  of	  hidden	  locations	  and	  influences.	  Digitalisation	  dissolves	  the	  generic	  and	  non-­‐place	  character	  of	  the	  booth,	  and	  turns	  it	  into	  a	  place,	  which	  is	  political	  and	  social.	  	  To	  summarise,	  the	  polling	  booth	  exemplifies	  well	  how	  anthropology	  can	  study	  sites	  that	  are	  both	  global	  and	  local,	  both	  generic	  and	  particular.	  As	  a	  generic	  concept	  or	  artefact	  the	  booth	  connects	  different	  electoral	  events	  around	  the	  globe.	  As	  ethnographers	  we	  have	  been	  present	  in	  polling	  booths	  multiple	  times	  at	  elections.	  We	  have	  not	  been	  present	  in	  all	  polling	  booths	  of	  course,	  and	  we	  are	  ordinarily	  not	  allowed	  to	  follow	  other	  voters	  into	  the	  booth.	  Yet	  the	  generic	  and	  global	  existence	  of	  this	  small	  place	  makes	  it	  accessible	  even	  if	  ballots	  for	  example	  are	  designed	  and	  marked	  in	  an	  immense	  variety	  of	  ways	  (e.g.	  Saltman	  2006;	  Jones	  &	  Simons	  2012).	  Differences	  in	  electoral	  designs	  of	  polling	  booths	  and	  balloting	  are	  important	  in	  so	  far	  as	  they	  enable	  ethnographic	  comparison	  between	  events	  that	  all	  address	  the	  ‘large	  issue’	  of	  democracy.	  This	  is	  why	  we	  have	  argued	  that	  electoral	  events	  and	  polling	  booths	  are	  precisely	  not	  
illustrations	  of	  social	  structure,	  and	  neither	  are	  they	  easily	  categorised	  as	  typical	  or	  atypical.	  In	  our	  case,	  we	  can	  productively	  view	  elections	  following	  Kapferer	  (2010)	  as	  ‘plateaus	  of	  intensity’,	  where	  tensions	  boil	  to	  the	  surface.	  In	  our	  specific	  case	  the	  debate	  about	  e-­‐voting	  was	  one	  such	  plateau	  itself,	  as	  it	  generated	  democratic	  engagement	  and	  discussion	  of	  a	  virtual	  event	  (e-­‐voting)	  imagined	  to	  take	  place	  in	  the	  future.	  E-­‐voting	  was	  risky	  and	  provided	  a	  ‘generative	  moment’	  for	  reflecting	  on	  the	  digital	  bounding	  of	  the	  polling	  booth.	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  Digitalisation	  appears	  in	  this	  respect	  to	  be	  the	  quasi-­‐grand	  narrative	  of	  the	  contemporary.	  Teleologically	  enmeshed	  in	  utopian	  as	  well	  as	  dystopian	  visions,	  it	  is	  exemplified	  by	  politically	  driven	  processes	  of	  digitalisation	  (see	  Dunleavy	  et	  al.	  2005)	  but	  also	  by	  for	  instance	  ubiquitous	  computing	  (see	  Greenfield	  2006).	  Ubiquitous	  computing	  promises	  to	  connect	  human	  beings	  constantly,	  but	  what	  would	  that	  mean	  for	  secret	  balloting?	  We	  do	  not	  have	  an	  answer,	  but	  such	  questions	  are	  part	  of	  the	  problematisations	  of	  democracy	  that	  computer	  scientists	  have	  begun	  to	  raise,	  and	  which	  social	  scientists	  ought	  to	  pay	  more	  attention	  to.	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Endnotes	  1.	  E.g.	  John	  Stuart	  Mill.	  The	  introduction	  of	  the	  secret	  ballot	  in	  the	  UK	  was	  part	  of	  a	  set	  of	  democratic	  reforms	  conferring	  the	  right	  to	  vote	  to	  new	  groups	  (O’Gorman	  2007).	  Alexis	  de	  Tocqueville	  (2000)	  also	  had	  interesting	  views	  regarding	  the	  secret	  ballot	  –	  for	  instance	  that	  it	  was	  needed	  in	  the	  stratified	  societies	  of	  the	  old	  world,	  but	  not	  in	  the	  egalitarian	  USA.	  2.	  One	  could	  argue	  that	  it	  is	  difficult	  to	  know	  what	  is	  typical	  or	  atypical	  –	  it	  has	  to	  be	  demonstrated	  in	  relation	  to	  other	  connected	  events	  or	  situations.	  While	  certainly	  breaking	  the	  ground	  for	  later	  theoretical	  developments,	  many	  of	  the	  Mancunians,	  by	  being	  too	  caught	  up	  in	  relating	  their	  ethnographic	  findings	  to	  some	  notion	  of	  ‘social	  structure’,	  still	  had	  difficulties	  breaking	  away	  from	  structural	  functionalism	  (cf.	  Kapferer	  2010).	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3.	  In	  Denmark,	  the	  parliamentary	  elections	  are	  held	  at	  a	  minimum	  every	  four	  years,	  but	  there	  are	  also	  municipal	  elections	  every	  four	  years	  and	  elections	  for	  the	  European	  Parliament	  every	  five	  years.	  4.	  This	  and	  other	  quotes	  from	  the	  debate	  are	  translated	  from	  Danish	  by	  the	  authors.	  5.	  Somewhat	  surprising	  to	  us,	  e-­‐voting	  has	  not	  been	  problematised	  in	  mainstream	  electoral	  studies	  (see	  for	  instance	  journals	  like	  Electoral	  Studies	  or	  
Journal	  of	  Democracy),	  but	  in	  the	  field	  of	  computer	  science	  there	  are	  conferences	  and	  journals	  devoted	  solely	  to	  this	  topic	  (e.g.	  EVOTE,	  VoteID	  and	  The	  USENIX	  
Journal	  of	  Election	  Technology	  and	  Systems).	  We	  have	  only	  found	  one	  scholar	  touching	  upon	  this	  in	  anthropology	  (Kelty	  2008,	  2009).	  6.	  The	  research	  group	  in	  question	  aim	  at	  using	  ’BitBallot’	  –	  a	  system	  built	  on	  the	  same	  principles	  as	  BitTorrent	  or	  Bitcoin,	  where	  the	  system	  and	  thus	  also	  the	  security	  is	  distributed	  among	  participants	  via	  the	  blockchain	  encryption	  protocol	  and	  not	  reliant	  upon	  a	  third	  (neutral	  and	  honest)	  party	  for	  guarantee.	  Trust	  is	  thus	  reliant	  on	  continuous	  expanding	  computation	  (with	  systematic	  randomness)	  rather	  than	  human	  actors.	  7.	  See	  www.regjeringen.no/en/dep/kmd/prosjekter/e-­‐vote-­‐trial/about-­‐the-­‐e-­‐vote-­‐project.html?id=597724.	  The	  unofficial	  argument	  made	  by	  the	  public	  servant	  responsible	  for	  the	  security	  of	  the	  Internet	  election,	  however,	  was	  that	  e-­‐voting	  should	  not	  stand	  alone	  but	  only	  work	  as	  a	  supplement	  to	  the	  analogue	  casting	  of	  ballots	  (Christian	  Bull,	  Kommunal-­‐	  og	  Regionaldepartementet,	  Norway,	  personal	  communication).	  	  8.	  Upon	  the	  conclusion	  of	  the	  second	  Norwegian	  election	  that	  allowed	  Internet	  balloting	  (September	  2013),	  the	  organiser	  Christian	  Bull	  publicly	  destroyed	  the	  memory	  sticks	  with	  the	  encrypted	  keys	  in	  a	  blender	  to	  make	  sure	  that	  nothing	  could	  be	  retrieved	  (see	  the	  online	  video:	  www.regjeringen.no/nb/dep/kmd/lyd_bilde/nett-­‐tv/decryption-­‐and-­‐counting-­‐ceremony-­‐of-­‐the-­‐.html?id=735138).	  	  	  
References	  	  
	   25	  
Associated	  Press,	  The.	  2016.	  US	  Elections	  Still	  Vulnerable	  to	  Rigging,	  Disruption.	  
The	  New	  York	  Times	  Dec	  26,	  2016.	  http://www.nytimes.com/aponline/2016/12/26/us/ap-­‐us-­‐election-­‐2016-­‐hacking-­‐the-­‐vote-­‐abridged.html.	  Accessed	  10.1.2017.	  	  Augé,	  Marc.	  1995.	  Non-­‐Places.	  New	  York:	  Verso.	  	  Banerjee,	  Mukulika.	  2011.	  Elections	  as	  Communitas.	  Social	  Research	  78(1):75-­‐98.	  	  Bertrand,	  Romain,	  Jean-­‐Louis	  Briquet	  &	  Peter	  Pels.	  2007.	  Introduction:	  Towards	  a	  Historical	  Ethnography	  of	  Voting.	  In	  Cultures	  of	  Voting:	  The	  Hidden	  
History	  of	  the	  Secret	  Ballot,	  edited	  by	  R.	  Bertrand,	  J.-­‐L.	  Briquet	  &	  P.	  Pels,	  pp.	  1-­‐15.	  London:	  Hurst.	  	  Coleman,	  Simon.	  2010.	  Re-­‐presenting	  Anthropology.	  In	  Ethnographic	  Practice	  in	  
the	  Present,	  edited	  by	  M.	  Melhuus,	  J.	  Mitchell	  &	  H.	  Wulff,	  pp.	  169-­‐175.	  New	  York:	  Berghahn.	  	  Coles,	  Kimberley.	  2007.	  Democratic	  Designs.	  Ann	  Arbor:	  The	  University	  of	  Michigan	  Press.	  	  Dalsgaard,	  Steffen.	  2010.	  All	  the	  Government’s	  Men:	  State	  and	  Leadership	  in	  Manus	  Province,	  Papua	  New	  Guinea.	  PhD	  thesis,	  Aarhus	  University.	  	  Dalsgaard,	  Steffen	  &	  Morten	  Nielsen.	  2013.	  Introduction:	  Time	  and	  the	  Field.	  
Social	  Analysis	  57(1):1-­‐19.	  	  Dunleavy,	  Patrick,	  Helen	  Margots,	  Simon	  Bastow	  &	  Jane	  Tinkler.	  2005.	  New	  Public	  Management	  is	  Dead.	  Long	  Live	  Digital-­‐Era	  Governance.	  Journal	  of	  
Public	  Administration	  Research	  and	  Theory	  16:467-­‐494.	  	  Elklit,	  Jørgen.	  1988.	  Fra	  Åben	  til	  Hemmelig	  Afstemning.	  Aarhus:	  Politica.	  
	   26	  
	  Eriksen,	  Thomas	  Hylland.	  1993.	  Små	  Steder,	  Store	  Spørsmål.	  Oslo:	  Universitetsforlaget.	  	  Folketinget.	  2012-­‐13.	  Forslag	  til	  Lov	  om	  ændring	  af	  lov	  om	  valg	  til	  Folketinget,	  lov	  om	  valg	  af	  danske	  medlemmer	  til	  Europa-­‐Parlamentet	  og	  lov	  om	  regionale	  og	  kommunale	  valg.	  Lovforslag	  nr.	  L	  132.	  Folketingstidende	  A.	  Christiansborg.	  (http://www.ft.dk/samling/20121/lovforslag/L132/index.htm).	  Accessed	  10.1.2017.	  	  Folketinget.	  2013.	   57.	  møde.	  Christiansborg	  (http://www.ft.dk/forhandlinger/20121/20121M057_2013-­‐02-­‐07_1000.htm).	  Accessed	  7.1.2017.	  	  Frénot,	  Stephane,	  Stephane	  Grumbach	  &	  Damien	  Reimert.	  2014.	  E-­‐Voting,	  the	  Case	  for	  Decentralised	  Systems.	  Paper	  presented	  at	  “Workshop	  on	  Cooperative	  Technologies	  in	  Democratic	  Processes	  –	  Beyond	  E-­‐voting”,	  
COOP,	  Nice,	  France,	  27	  May	  2014.	  	  Gad,	  Christopher	  &	  Steffen	  Dalsgaard.	  2015.	  Digital	  Optimering:	  Refleksioner	  over	  E-­‐valgsdebatten	  i	  Danmark.	  Tidsskriftet	  Antropologi	  70:153-­‐169.	  	  -­‐-­‐-­‐.	  2017.	  Disability	  as	  Infra-­‐Critique:	  A	  Compositionist	  Approach	  to	  the	  Election	  Process	  in	  Denmark.	  Journal	  of	  Cultural	  Economy	  10(3):237-­‐250.	  	  Gibbs,	  Philip.	  2004.	  LPV	  in	  Enga:	  The	  Wabaq	  Open	  Electorate.	  Election	  2007:	  The	  
Shift	  to	  Limited	  Preferential	  Voting	  in	  Papua	  New	  Guinea,	  edited	  by	  RJ	  May,	  R.	  Anere,	  N.	  Haley	  &	  K.	  Wheen.	  pp.	  261-­‐283.	  Waigani:	  The	  National	  Research	  Institute.	  	  Greenfield,	  Adam.	  2006.	  Everyware:	  The	  Dawning	  Age	  of	  Ubiquitous	  Computing.	  Berkeley,	  CA:	  New	  Riders.	  
	   27	  
	  Gupta,	  Akhil	  &	  James	  Ferguson.	  (eds.)	  1997.	  Anthropological	  Locations.	  Berkeley:	  University	  of	  California	  Press.	  	  Halderman,	  Alex.	  2016.	  Want	  to	  Know	  if	  the	  Election	  was	  Hacked?	  Look	  at	  the	  Ballots.	  Medium,	  Nov	  23,	  2016.	  https://medium.com/@jhalderm/want-­‐to-­‐know-­‐if-­‐the-­‐election-­‐was-­‐hacked-­‐look-­‐at-­‐the-­‐ballots-­‐c61a6113b0ba#.itps05edi.	  Accessed	  7.1.2017	  	  Handelman,	  Don.	  1998.	  Models	  and	  Mirrors.	  New	  York:	  Berghahn	  Books.	  	  Jones,	  Douglas	  &	  Barbara	  Simons.	  2012.	  Broken	  Ballots:	  Will	  Your	  Vote	  Count?	  Stanford:	  CSLI	  Publications.	  	  Kapferer,	  Bruce.	  2010.	  Introduction:	  In	  the	  Event	  –	  toward	  an	  Anthropology	  of	  Generic	  Moments.	  Social	  Analysis	  54(3):1-­‐27.	  	  Kelty,	  Christopher.	  2008.	  Toward	  an	  Anthropology	  of	  Deliberation.	  Paper	  presented	  at	  the	  Society	  for	  Social	  Studies	  of	  Science	  conference,	  Montreal,	  October	  2008	  (http://kelty.org/or/papers/unpublishable/Kelty_Anthro_of_Delib_2008.pdf).	  Accessed	  13.1.2017.	  	  Kelty,	  Christopher.	  2009.	  Collaboration,	  Coordination	  and	  Composition.	  
Fieldwork	  Is	  Not	  What	  It	  Used	  to	  Be,	  edited	  by	  J.	  Faubion	  &	  G.	  Marcus,	  pp.	  184-­‐206.	  Ithaca:	  Cornell	  University	  Press.	  	  Kildebogaard,	  Jesper.	  2013a.	  E-­‐Valgsforskere	  Kørt	  Over	  af	  Travle	  Politikere:	  Vent	  dog	  til	  Vi	  Er	  Færdige.	  Version2,	  Feb	  6,	  2013.	  https://www.version2.dk/artikel/e-­‐valgsforskere-­‐koert-­‐over-­‐af-­‐e-­‐valgs-­‐lovforslag-­‐vent-­‐dog-­‐til-­‐vi-­‐er-­‐faerdige-­‐50256,	  accessed	  8.1.2017.	  	  
	   28	  
Kildebogaard,	  Jesper.	  2013b.	  Venstre	  Siger	  Nej	  til	  E-­‐Valg	  –	  Lovforslaget	  Falder.	  
Version2.	  March	  21,	  2013.	  https://www.version2.dk/artikel/breaking-­‐venstre-­‐siger-­‐nej-­‐til-­‐e-­‐valg-­‐lovforslaget-­‐falder-­‐51198.	  Accessed	  9.1.2017.	  	  Lessig,	  Lawrence.	  2006.	  Code.	  2nd	  Edition.	  New	  York:	  Basic	  Books.	  	  Marcus,	  George.	  1995.	  Ethnography	  in/of	  the	  World	  System:	  The	  Emergence	  of	  Multi-­‐Sited	  Ethnography.	  Annual	  Review	  of	  Anthropology	  24:95-­‐117.	  	  Meister,	  Mikkel.	  2013.	  Version2’s	  Læsere	  Rykker	  Venstre	  mod	  et	  Nej	  til	  E-­‐Valg.	  
Version2,	  March	  12,	  2013.	  https://www.version2.dk/artikel/version2s-­‐laesere-­‐flytter-­‐manden-­‐i-­‐midten-­‐mod-­‐et-­‐nej-­‐til-­‐e-­‐valg-­‐50864,	  accessed	  8.1.2017.	  	  Miller,	  Clark.	  2004.	  Interrogating	  the	  Civic	  Epistemology	  of	  American	  Democracy.	  
Social	  Studies	  of	  Science	  34(4):501-­‐530.	  	  Mitchell,	  Jon.	  2010.	  Introduction.	  Ethnographic	  Practice	  in	  the	  Present,	  edited	  by	  M.	  Melhuus,	  J.	  Mitchell	  &	  H.	  Wulff,	  pp.	  1-­‐15.	  New	  York:	  Berghahn.	  	  Moore,	  Sally	  Falk.	  2005.	  Comparisons:	  Possible	  and	  Impossible.	  Annual	  Review	  of	  
Anthropology	  34:1-­‐11.	  	  Norris,	  Pippa.	  2004.	  Electoral	  Engineering.	  Voting	  Rules	  and	  Political	  Behavior.	  Cambridge:	  Cambridge	  University	  Press.	  	  O’Gorman,	  Frank.	  2007.	  The	  Secret	  Ballot	  in	  Nineteenth-­‐Century	  Britain.	  Cultures	  
of	  Voting:	  The	  Hidden	  History	  of	  the	  Secret	  Ballot	  ,	  edited	  by	  R.	  Bertrand,	  J.-­‐L.	  Briquet	  &	  P.	  Pels,	  pp.	  16-­‐42.	  London:	  Hurst.	  	  Oostveen,	  A.-­‐M.	  2010.	  Outsourcing	  Democracy:	  Losing	  Control	  of	  E-­‐Voting	  in	  the	  Netherlands.	  Policy	  &	  Internet	  2(4):201-­‐220.	  	  	  
	   29	  
Orr,	  Graeme.	  2015.	  Ritual	  and	  Rhythm	  in	  Electoral	  Systems.	  Farnham:	  Ashgate.	  	  Saltman,	  Roy.	  2006.	  The	  History	  and	  Politics	  of	  Voting	  Technology.	  New	  York:	  Palgrave	  Macmillan.	  	  Sandal,	  Jesper	  Stein.	  2015.	  Derfor	  Stemmer	  Vi	  Ikke	  Over	  Internettet	  i	  Dag.	  
Version2.	  Dec	  2,	  2015.	  http://www.version2.dk/artikel/derfor-­‐stemmer-­‐vi-­‐ikke-­‐over-­‐internettet-­‐i-­‐dag-­‐494381?utm_source=nyhedsbrev&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=v2daglig.	  Accessed	  8.12.15.	  	  Simons,	  Barbara	  &	  Douglas	  Jones.	  2012.	  Internet	  Voting	  in	  the	  U.S.	  
Communications	  of	  the	  ACM	  55(10):68-­‐77.	  	  Springall,	  Drew,	  Travis	  Finkenauer,	  Zakir	  Durumeric,	  Jason	  Kitcat,	  Harri	  Hursti,	  Margaret	  MacAlpine	  &	  Alex	  Halderman.	  2014.	  Security	  Analysis	  of	  the	  Estonian	  Internet	  Voting	  System.	  Proceedings	  of	  the	  21st	  ACM	  Conference	  
on	  Computer	  and	  Communications	  Security,	  Scottsdale,	  Arizona,	  November	  3-­‐7,	  2014.	  	  	  Stenerud,	  Ida	  S.G.	  &	  Christian	  Bull.	  2012.	  When	  Reality	  Comes	  Knocking	  –	  Norwegian	  Experiences	  with	  Verifiable	  Electronic	  Voting.	  EVOTE	  
Proceedings	  2012:21-­‐33.	  	  Strathern,	  Marilyn.	  1988.	  The	  Gender	  of	  the	  Gift.	  Berkeley:	  University	  of	  California	  Press.	  	  -­‐-­‐-­‐.	  1990.	  Artefacts	  of	  History.	  Culture	  and	  History	  in	  the	  Pacific,	  edited	  by	  J.	  Siikala,	  pp.	  25-­‐44.	  Helsinki:	  The	  Finnish	  Anthropological	  Society.	  	  -­‐-­‐-­‐.	  2014.	  Reading	  Relations	  Backwards.	  Journal	  of	  the	  Royal	  Anthropological	  
Institute	  (N.S.)	  20:3-­‐19.	  	  
	   30	  
Tocqueville,	  Alexis	  de.	  2000	  [1835-­‐1840].	  Democracy	  in	  America.	  Volume	  I	  and	  II	  (Mansfield	  and	  Winthrop,	  transl.).	  Chicago:	  University	  of	  Chicago	  Press.	  	  	  Turner,	  Victor.	  1967.	  The	  Forest	  of	  Symbols.	  Ithaca,	  NY:	  Cornell	  University	  Press.	  	  Vadgaard,	  Anne	  Kathrine	  Pihl.	  2016.	  The	  Election	  Machine	  –	  Generating	  Danish	  Democray.	  PhD	  thesis,	  IT	  University	  of	  Copenhagen.	  	  Vestager,	  Margrethe.	  2013.	  Derfor	  Skal	  Vi	  Afprøve	  E-­‐Valg.	  Version2,	  guest	  blog.	  Feb	  8,	  2013.	  https://www.version2.dk/blog/derfor-­‐skal-­‐vi-­‐afproeve-­‐e-­‐valg-­‐50341,	  accessed	  10.1.2017.	  	  Wisconsin	  Elections	  Commission	  2016.	  Wisconsin	  Recount	  Petition	  of	  Jill	  Stein.	  Madison,	  WI.	  http://elections.wi.gov/sites/default/files/news/wisconsin_recount_petition_of_jill_stein_00268242_12391.pdf.	  Accessed	  13.1.2017.	  	  	  	  
